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Abstract 
In	the	course	of	the	re‐codification	of	Hungarian	civil	law,	the	problems	of	the	legal	
construction	in	general	called	simply”	presumption	of	simultaneous	death	in	common	
disaster”	 have	 occurred.	 In	 this	 paper	we	 intend	 to	 present	 the	 historical	 roots	 in	
Roman	 law	 (I.)	 and	 in	 authoritative	 codifications	 of	 the	modern	 age	 (II.)	 and	 to	
consider	 the	regulation	variations	of	 the	 issue	one	by	one	 (III.).	After	 that	we	 shall	
illustrate	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 effective	 Hungarian	 Civil	 Code	 (Ptk.),	 the	
amendment	and	 the	 settlement	based	on	 the	proposal	by	 some	practical	 examples	
(IV.);	then,	de	lege	ferenda	we	shall	sum	up	the,	in	our	opinion,	optimal	solutions	(V.).	
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I.	With	regard	to	the	regulation	of	inheritance	from	each	other	of	persons	who	
died	 in	 a	 common	 event	 /	 common	 disaster	 Roman	 law	 textbooks	 state,	 that	 the	
following:	 ”To	make	 it	easier	 to	decide	 inheritance	disputes,	 in	post‐classical	Roman	
law	 it	has	been	presumed	 that	 in	 circumstances	where	ascendants	and	descendants	
died	 in	a	common	disaster,	underage	children	were	deemed	to	have	died	before	their	
parents,	 and	 grownup	 children	 to	 have	 died	 after	 their	 parents.”1	 Yet,	 in	
circumstances	where	several	persons	who	are	not	relatives	die	at	the	same	time,	the	
source	takes	a	stand	for	simultaneous	occurrence	of	death.	To	examine	the	solution	
outlined	 first,	 we	 shall	 carry	 out	 in‐depth	 analysis	 of	 four	 of	 the	 seven	 loci	 in	
Iustinian’s	Digest	 and	 concerning	 the	 regulation	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 second	 option,	
four	from	among	the	twelve	texts	available	to	us.2	
I.	1.	In	Papinian’s3	fragment4	the	father‐in‐law	and	his	son‐in‐law	entered	into	
an	agreement	that	 in	circumstances	where	a	one‐year‐old	male	child	 is	 left	behind	
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1	 	See	 e.g.	 T.	 Nótári,	 Római	 köz‐	 és	magánjog.	 (Public	 and	 Private	 Roman	 Law),	 Cluj‐Napoca,	 2011,		
p.	190.	
2	 	On	the	sources	disussed	in	this	paper	see	G..	Hamza,	Az	együtt	elhaltakra	vonatkozó	vélelmek	a	római	
jogban.	 (Presuptions	concerning	commorientes	 in	Roman	Law)	 in	 ”Acta	Univ.	Budapestinensis	Sectio	
Politico‐Juridica”,	18,	1976,	pp.	347–361;	G.	Hamza,	A.	Sajó,	Az	együtt	elhalás	néhány	jogi	kérdése.	(Some	
legal	questions	concerning	commorientes),	in	”Magyar	Jog”,	1976,	3,	pp.	191–202.	
3	 	On	Papinian	see	F.	Schulz:	Geschichte	der	römischen	Rechtswissenschaft,	Weimar,	1961,	p.	126;	 J.	A.	
Ankum,	Papinian,	ein	dunkler	Jurist?,	in	”Orbis	Iuris	Romani”,	2,	1996.	
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after	the	death	of	the	girl	or	wife,	the	dowry	will	belong	to	the	husband;	if,	however,	
the	child	dies	during	 the	 life	of	his/her	mother,	 then	 the	husband	can	keep	only	a	
certain	part	of	the	dowry,	on	condition,	as	a	matter	of	 fact,	 that	the	marriage	bond	
existed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 woman’s	 death.5	 The	 mother	 and	 her	 child	 died	 in	 a	
shipwreck	 and	 as	 the	 order	 of	 death	 could	 not	 be	 determined	 subsequently,	 it	
seemed	 probable	 to	 the	 jurist	 that	 the	mother	 survived	 the	 infant;	 therefore,	 the	
husband	could	keep	only	a	part	of	the	dowry.	One	of	Gaius’s6	loci7	determines	it	as	a	
rule	in	a	normative	form	that	in	circumstances	where	the	mother	and	her	underage	
male	child8	die	in	a	shipwreck,	the	child	shall	be	deemed	to	have	died	first.9	
In	 Tryphonin’s10	 fragment11	 the	 father	 and	 his	 son	 were	 killed	 in	 war;	 the	
mother	claimed	the	son’s	property	based	on	the	son’s	 later	death	–	most	probably	
on	the	grounds	of	the	senatus	consultum	Tertullianum	(Ulp.	D.	26,	8.),12	which	can	be	
dated	to	the	time	of	Hadrian’s	rule;	on	the	other	hand,	agnate	relatives	claimed	the	
father’s	 total	 property	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 son’s	 earlier	 death.	 The	 legal	 scientist	
refers	 to	 Hadrian’s	 rescriptum	 which	 deems	 the	 father	 to	 have	 died	 earlier,	 and	
accordingly	 decides	 the	 legal	 dispute	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 mother.13	 Although	 the	
fragment	does	not	specify	the	boy’s	age,	we	can	most	probably	assume	that	being	a	
grownup	young	man	he	took	part	in	the	war	together	with	his	father	as	a	soldier.14	A	
following	 fragment	 of	 Tryphonin15	 also	 specifies	 two	 possible	 variations	 for	 an	
inheritance	law	issue	where	the	simultaneous	death	of	the	father	and	his	son	–	who	
is	his	father’s	only	testamentary	heir16	‐	constitutes	the	basis	of	the	state	of	facts:	If	
the	 boy	 is	 grownup,	 then	 he	 shall	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 father	 and	 his	
                                                                                                                                                                  
4	 	Pap.	 D.	 23.	 4.	 26.	 pr.	 Inter	 socerum	 et	 generum	 convenit,	 ut,	 si	 filia	mortua	 superstitem	 anniculum	
filium	habuisset,	dos	ad	virum	pertineret,	quod	si	vivente	matre	filius	obisset,	vir	dotis	portionem	uxore	in	
matrimonio	defuncta	retineret.	Mulier	naufragio	cum	anniculo	filio	periit,	quia	verisimile	videbatur	ante	
matrem	infantem	perisse,	virum	partem	dotis	retinere	placuit.	
5	 	See	M.	Lauria,	Matrimonio	e	dote	 in	diritto	romano,	Napoli,	1952,	A.	Wacke,	Actio	rerum	amotarum,	
Köln–Graz,	1963.	
6	 	See	A.	N.	Honoré,	Gaius,	Oxford,	1962;	Gy.	Diósdi,	Gaius,	der	Rechtsgelehrte,	in	ANRW,	II,	15,	1976.	
7	 	Gai.	D.	34.	5.	23,	Si	mulier	cum	filio	impubere	naufragio	periit,	priorem	filium	necatum	esse	intellegitur.	
8	 	See	also	A.	B.	Schwarz,	Die	 justinianische	Reform	des	Pubertätsbeginns	und	die	Beilegung	 juristischer	
Kontroversen,	 in	 ZSS,	 69,	 1952;	 J.	 A.	 Ankum,	 Les	 ’infanti	 proximi’	 dans	 la	 jurisprudence	 classique,	 in	
”Estudios	F.	Hernandez‐Tejero”,	Madrid,	1993.	
9	 	G.	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	350.	
10	See	P.	Krüger,	Geschichte	der	Quellen	und	Literatur	des	römischen	Rechts,	1912,	p.	225;	Schulz,	op.	cit.,	
p.	126.	
11	Tryph.	 D.	 34.	 5.	 9.	 1.	 Cum	 bello	 pater	 cum	 filio	 perisset	materque	 filii	 quodsi	 postea	mortui	 bona	
vindicaret,	adgnati	vero	patris,	quasi	filius	ante	perisset,	divus	Hadrianus	credidit	patrem	prius	mortuum.	
12	On	 senatus	 consultum	 Tertullianum	 see	 C.	 Sanfilippo,	 Di	 una	 interpretazione	 giurisprudenziale	 dei	
senatoconsulti	Orfiziano	e	Tertulliano,	in	”Festschrift	F.	Schulz”.	I,	Weimar,	1951.	
13	Cf.	M.	 Kaser,	Beweislast	und	Vermutung	 im	 römischen	Formularprozess,	 in	 ”Zeitschrift	 der	 Savigny‐
Stiftung	für	Rechtsgeschichte,	Romanistische	Abteilung”,	71,	1954,	p.	239.	
14	G..	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	350.	
15	Tryph.	D.	 34.	 5.	 9.	 4.	Si	Lucius	Titius	cum	 filio	pubere,	quem	 testamento	 scriptum	heredem	habebat,	
perierit,	 intellegitur	supervixisse	 filius	patri	et	ex	testamento	heres	 fuisse,	et	 filii	hereditas	successoribus	
eius	 defertur,	 nisi	 contrarium	 approbetur.	 Quod	 si	 impubes	 cum	 patre	 filius	 perierit,	 creditur	 pater	
supervixisse,	nisi	et	hic	contrarium	approbetur.	
16	See	also	M.	Amelotti,	Le	forme	classiche	di	testamento	I–II,	Torino,	1966–1967.	
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successors	are	entitled	to	the	estate;	if,	however,	the	boy	is	underage,	then	the	father	
shall	be	deemed	to	have	survived	his	son.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	presumption	can	be	
refuted	 by	 proving	 the	 opposite.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Max	
Kaser	considers	the	phrase	”nisi	contrarium	approbetur”	interpolation.17	
I.	2.	Ulpian’s	 fragment18	dealing	with	 the	validity	of	donation	between	marital	
partners	 first	 establishes	 that	 donation	 shall	 be	 invalid	when	 the	 donee	 dies	 first	
from	among	the	persons	taken	captive.	What	would	be	the	solution	if	both	of	them	
die	during	the	same	natural	disaster	(shipwreck,	fire)	and	it	cannot	be	determined	
who	 dies	 first?	 The	 legal	 scientist,	 referring	 to	 oratio	 Severi	 from	 206,	 considers	
donation	 valid	 because	 the	 donee	 shall	 not	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 died	 earlier;	
accordingly,	donation	must	be	considered	valid	also	in	mutual	donation;	therefore,	
the	gift	 shall	belong	 to	 the	 inheritor.19	 If	marital	partners	making	mutual	donation	
provably	do	not	die	at	the	same	time	after	having	been	taken	captive,	according	to	
Ulpian,	 in	theory	the	following	solutions	can	be	taken	into	account:	on	the	basis	of	
fictio	 legis	 Corneliae20	 being	 taken	 captive	 is	 considered	 as	 it	 were	 simultaneous	
death,	and	in	this	case	donation	will	remain	valid;	the	marriage	terminated	already	
in	 their	 life	 in	 the	 moment	 when	 they	 were	 taken	 captive,	 and	 for	 this	 reason	
donation	is	invalid;	donation	will	be	valid	only	in	the	event	that	the	donee	survived	
the	donation;	and	the	donation	will	be	valid	only	when	the	donee	returned.	Ulpian	
presumes	 the	 first	 version:	when	being	 taken	 captive	 the	marital	 partners	died	 at	
the	same	time,	and	so	donation	can	be	considered	valid	–	in	his	solution	he	extends	
the	 presumption	 of	 simultaneous	 death	 based	 on	 fictio	 legis	 Corneliae	 through	
analogy	to	persons	taken	captive	simultaneously	as	well.21	
One	 of	 Tryphonin’s	 fragments22	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 validity	 of	 stipulatio	
aimed	at	returning	dos	receptitia23	and	made	subject	to	fulfilling	the	condition	of	the	
wife’s	 death	 occurring	 during	 the	marriage;	 in	 simultaneous	 death	 of	 the	martial	
                                                            
17	Kaser,	op.	cit.,	p.	239;	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976.	p.	351.	
18	Ulp.	D.	24.	1.	32.	14.	Si	ambo	ab	hostibus	capti	sint	et	qui	donavit	et	cui	donatum	est,	quid	dicimus?	Et	
prius	illud	volo	tractare.	Oratio,	si	ante	mors	contigerit	ei	cui	donatum	est,	nullius	momenti	donationem	
esse	voluit:	ergo	si	ambo	decesserint,	quid	dicemus,	naufragio	 forte	vel	ruina	vel	 incendio?	Et	si	quidem	
possit	apparere,	quis	ante	spiritum	posuit,	expedita	est	quaestio:	sin	vero	non	appareat,	difficilis	quaestio	
est.	Et	magis	puto	donationem	valuisse	et	his	ex	verbis	orationis	defendimus:	ait	enim	oratio	si	prior	vita	
decesserit	qui	donatum	accepit:	non	videtur	autem	prior	vita	decessisse	qui	donatum	accepit,	cum	simul	
decesserint.	Proinde	 rectissime	dicetur	utrasque	 donationes	 valere,	 si	 forte	 invicem	 donationibus	 factis	
simul	decesserint,	quia	neuter	alteri	supervixerit,	licet	de	commorientibus	oratio	oratio	non	senserit:	sed	
cum	neuter	alteri	supervixerit,	donationes	mutuae	valebunt:	nam	et	circa	mortis	causa	donationes	mutuas	
id	erat	consequens	dicere	neuteri	datam	condictionem:	 locuples	 igitur	heredes	donationibus	relinquent.	
Secundum	haec	si	ambo	ab	hostibus	simul	capti	sint	amboque	ibi	decesserint	non	simul,	utrum	captivitatis	
spectamus	 tempus,	 ut	 dicamus	 donationes	 valere,	 quasi	 simul	 decesserint?	 An	 neutram,	 quia	 vivis	 eis	
finitum	est	matrimonium?	An	spectemus,	uter	prius	decesserit,	ut	in	eius	persona	non	valeat	donatio:	an	
uter	 rediit,	 ut	 eius	 valeat;	 mea	 tamen	 fert	 opinio,	 ubi	 non	 reverterunt,	 ut	 tempus	 spectandum	 sit	
captivitatis,	quasi	tunc	defecerint:	quod	si	alter	redierit,	eum	videri	supervixisse,	quia	redit.	
19	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	354.	
20	Nótári,	op.	cit.,	p.	201.	
21	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	354.	
22	Tryph.	D.	34.	5.	9.	3.	Si	maritus	et	uxor	simul	perierint,	stipulatio	de	dote	ex	capitulo	si	in	matrimonio	
mulier	decessisset	habebit	locum;	si	non	probatur	illa	superstes	viro	fuisset.	
23	See	Nótári,	op.	cit.,	p.	216.		
	Fiat	Iustitia				No.	2/2013	 Tamás	NÓTÁRI,	Tekla	PAPP	15
partners	 it	 arises	 as	 a	 question	 whether	 this	 condition	 has	 been	 satisfied.	 If	 the	
woman	had	survived	her	husband,	the	condition	of	the	transaction	would	not	have	
been	fulfilled	since	it	would	have	been	possible	to	consider	the	marriage	terminated	
through	 the	 husband’s	 death	 already.	 The	 legal	 scientist	 presumes	 simultaneous	
death	of	the	marital	partners	–	without	even	mentioning	the	possibility	of	the	wife’s	
dying	earlier	–	and	as	the	marriage	terminated	upon	the	wife’s	death,	the	condition	
of	stipulatio	must	be	accepted	as	fulfilled.24	
Tryphonin’s	 fragment	 discussing	 the	 position	 of	 substitute	 inheritor25	 reveals	
the	following	state	of	facts:	the	testator	has	two	underage	sons	and	orders	Titius	to	
be	 the	 substitute	 inheritor	 of	 the	 son	who	 dies	 later;	 however,	 the	 two	 underage	
boys	die	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 shipwreck.	Whose	estate	will	 belong	 to	Titius?	 If	 the	
brothers	had	died	one	after	the	other,	the	one	who	died	later	would	have	inherited	
the	 property	 of	 the	 boy	 who	 died	 earlier,	 and	 so	 Titius	 as	 inheritor	 of	 the	 child	
having	 died	 later	 could	 have	 acquired	 both	 estates.	 Yet,	 Titius	was	 appointed	 the	
inheritor	 of	 the	 child	 who	 dies	 later,	 however,	 setting	 out	 of	 the	 presumption	 of	
simultaneous	 death,	 none	 of	 the	 brothers	 can	 be	 considered	 to	 have	 survived	 the	
other;	 according	 to	 Tryphonin,	 one	must	 set	 out	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 brothers	
shall	be	 considered	as	having	died	 later.26	Marcian’s	 fragment27	 raises	 the	 issue	of	
inheritance	of	simultaneously	dying	substitutus	–	in	this	case	the	inheritor’s	sibling	–	
and	 the	 inheritor,	 and	 the	 inheritance	 of	 simultaneously	 dying	 siblings	 acting	 as	
mutually	substitute	inheritors	of	each	other	from	each	other	and	the	inheritance	of	
the	substitutus.	Marcian	–	 in	 the	absence	of	 the	opposite	being	proved	–	presumes	
their	death	simultaneous	by	a	general,	rule‐like	formulation,	and	declares	that	they	
cannot	inherit	from	each	and	that	the	substitutus	cannot	inherit	either.28	
I.	3.	After	having	surveyed	the	sources,	it	seems	to	be	appropriate	to	add	some	
terminological	 remarks	 to	 the	 fragments	 that	 discuss	 the	 issue	 of	 simultaneous	
death:	The	phrase	”commorientes”	occurs	only	in	one	source.29	Nevertheless,	several	
times	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 read	 the	 phrases	 ”simul	 perierint”30	 or	 in	 singularis	 ”simul	
perierit”31	 and	 ”simul	 perit”32	 or	 their	 synonyms,	 for	 example,	 ”simul	 obissent”33,	
                                                            
24	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	355.	
25	Tryph.	D.	34.	5.	9.	pr.	Qui	duos	impuberes	filios	habebat,	ei	qui	supremus	moritur	Titium	substituit:	duo	
impuberes	simul	in	nave	perierunt:	quaesitum	est,	an	substituto	et	cuius	hereditas	deferatur.	Dixi,	si	ordine	
vita	 decessissent,	 priori	 mortuo	 frater	 ab	 intestato	 heres	 erit,	 posteriori	 substitutus:	 in	 ea	 tamen	
hereditate	 etiam	 ante	 defuncti	 filii	 habebit	 hereditatem.	 In	 proposita	 autem	 quaestione	 ubi	 simul	
perierunt,	quia,	cum	neutri	 frater	 superstes	 fuit,	quasi	utrique	ultimi	decessisse	 sibi	videantur?	An	vero	
neutri,	quia	comparatio	posterioris	decendentia	ex	 facto	prioris	mortuo	sumitur?	Sed	superior	sententia	
magis	 admittenda	 est,	 ut	 utrique	 heres	 sit:	 nam	 et	 qui	 unicum	 filium	 habet,	 si	 supremum	 morienti	
substituit,	non	videtur	inutiliter	substituisse:	et	proximus	adgnatus	intellegitur	etiam	qui	solus	est	quique	
neminem	antecedit:	et	hic	utrique,	quia	neutri	eorum	alter	superstes	fuit,	ultimi	primique	obierunt.	
26	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	356.	
27	Marci.	D.	34.	5.	18.	pr.	
28	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	358.	
29	Ulp.	D.	24.	1.	32.	14.	
30	Tryph.	D.	34.	5.	9.	3;	Papin.	D.	28.	6.	42.	
31	Tryph.	D.	34.	5.	9.	2.	
32	Marci.	D.	34.	5.	16.	pr.	
33	Marci.	D.	36.	1.	35.	
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”simul	 functus	 sit”34,	 ”pariter	 decesserint”35	 and	 ”pariter	mortuis”36	 as	 well.37	 The	
source	of	danger,	which	results	in	the	simultaneous	death	of	several	persons,	is	not	
named	in	concreto	in	most	of	the	loci;38	the	possible	sources	of	danger	are	defined	in	
the	widest	scope	by	the	 fragment	 that	 indicates,	 in	addition	to	shipwreck,	collapse	
and	attack,	danger	in	general	that	threatens	with	occurrence	”in	some	other	form”39	
and	 elsewhere	 the	 text	most	 often	mentions	 shipwreck,40	 fire,	 collapse	 and	 being	
taken	prisoner	of	war41.	Based	on	all	that	it	can	be	established	that	the	term	”died	in	
common	disaster”	 cannot	be	supported	by	Roman	sources	as	we	cannot	meet	with	
the	phrase	”periculum	commune”	in	them.42	
From	 among	 the	 cases	 quoted	 in	 the	 first	 group,	 the	 first	 two	 sources	 from	
Gaius	 and	 Papinian	 report	 the	 simultaneous	 death	 of	 a	 parent	 and	 his	 underage	
child,	 while	 the	 loci	 cited	 from	 Tryphonin	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 the	 simultaneous	
death	of	a	grownup	child	and	his	parent.	In	case	of	common	death	of	the	underage	
child	 and	 the	parent,	 experience	 of	 everyday	 life	makes	 it	more	probable	 that	 the	
person	 in	 weaker	 physical	 condition,	 i.e.,	 the	 underage	 child	 will	 not	 survive	 the	
parent.	Consequently,	it	can	be	fully	accepted	that	Papinian	raises	probability	in	his	
responsum	as	reason;43	accordingly,	praesumptio	can	be	applied	without	exception.44	
In	the	circumstances	where	the	parent	and	his	grownup	child	decease	at	 the	same	
time,	legal	scientists	never	refer	to	the	point	that	owing	to	his	more	viable	physical	
conditions	the	child	would	by	all	means	survive	the	parent	since	it	is	far	from	being	
certain,	although	this	does	not	seem	to	be	unacceptable	in	case	of	an	elderly	parent	
and	an	adult	child;	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 think	of	 the	possibilities	and	circumstances	of	
the	destruction	of	a	young	adult	parent	and	his	just	grownup	child.	For	this	reason,	
legal	 scientists,	 being	 aware	of	 the	 fabricatedness	of	 the	presumed	order	of	 death	
themselves,	 support	 their	 opinion	 by	 general	 humanity45	 or	 a	 given	 imperial	
decree46;	and	in	certain	cases	to	assert	other	legal	law	aspects	they	take	exception	to	
applying	 the	 presumption.47	 Consequently,	 Roman	 law	 did	 not	 set	 up	 any	
presumption	of	general	validity	for	the	case	of	simultaneous	death	of	grownup	and	
underage	persons;	age	presumed	earlier	occurrence	of	death	of	any	of	the	persons	
involved	 solely	 in	 simultaneous	 death	 of	 the	 parent	 and	 their	 child,	 so	 in	 a	 very	
narrow	scope!48	
                                                            
34	Marci.	D.	34.	5.	18.	1.	
35	Marci.	D.	34.	5.	18.	pr.;	Marci.	D.	39.	6.	26.	
36	Marci.	D.	34.	5.	16.	pr.	
37	Cf.	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	348.	
38	D.	24.	1.	32.	14;	28.	6.	34.	pr.;	28.	6.	42;	34.	5.	8;	34.	5.	9.	2;	34.	5.	9.	3;	34.	5.	9.	4;	34.	5.	16.	pr.;	34.	5.	
16.	1;	34.	5.	17;	34.	5.	18.	pr.;	34.	5.	18.	1;	36.	1.	35;	39.	6.	26.	
39	Ulp.	D.	36.	1.	18.	7.	
40	D.	23.	4.	26.	pr.;	D.	34.	5.	22;	D.	34.	5.	23;	Tryph.	D.	34.	5.	9.	pr.	
41	Ulp.	D.	24.	1.	32.	14.	
42	Cf.	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	192.	200;	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	347.	
43	D.	23.	4.	26.	pr.	
44	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	352;	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	193.	
45	D.	34.	5.	22.	See	also	F.	Schulz,	Prinzipien	des	römischen	Recht,.	Leipzig,	1934,	pp.	128–150.	
46	D.	34.	5.	9.	1..	eod.	16.	pr.	
47	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	353;	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	193.	
48	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	359.	
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The	fragments	listed	in	the	second	group	generally	assert	the	presumption	that	
assumes	 simultaneous	 occurrence	 of	 death	 in	 case	 of	 common	 death	 of	 several	
persons,	and	based	on	this	praesumptio	iuris	 legal	scientists	rule	out	the	possibility	
of	 inheritance	 from	each	other	of	persons	who	died	at	 the	same	time.	 It	should	be	
noted	that	this	proposition	could	be	applied	only	in	the	event	that	the	simultaneous	
death	of	the	persons	concerned	was	caused	by	the	same	event,	natural	disaster.49	
	
II.	 First,	 we	 shall	 survey	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 Code	 civil,	 then	 German	
codes	of	law,	more	specifically	ALR,	ABGB,	the	Saxon	BGB	of	1863	and	the	German	
BGB	of	1900,	after	that,	two	Anglo‐Saxon	laws,	the	British	Law	of	Property	Act	and	
the	 American	 Uniform	 Simultaneous	 Death	 Act,	 finally,	 Hungarian	 codification	
attempts.	
II.	 1.	 In	 Code	 Civil50	 we	 can	 find	 the	 presumption	 of	 the	 right	 of	 mutual	
inheritance	of	persons	who	died	in	the	same	event	(un	mème	événement),	based	on	
difference	of	age,	which,	however,	could	be	applied	only	subsidiarily,	 i.e.,	 in	case	 it	
was	 not	 possible	 to	 determine	 who	 died	 earlier;	 in	 accordance	 with	 Section	 720	
presumption	of	survival	shall	be	established	on	the	basis	of	actual	circumstances	–	
in	accordance	with	Section	Cc.	1353	presumption	based	on	actual	circumstances	is	
nothing	else	than	authorisation	of	the	judge	to	form	a	presumption	of	the	probability	
occurring	 in	 the	 state	of	 facts	–	and	 in	 the	absence	of	 actual	 circumstances	on	 the	
basis	of	 age	or	gender.51	When	creating	 the	 legal	presumption,	 the	 lawmaker	 took	
the	given	persons’	physical	capacity	 to	resist	as	a	basis.52	The	aim	of	 the	provision	
was	to	reproduce	the	logically	most	reasonable	state	of	facts	rather	than	to	settle	the	
financial	standing	as	fairly	as	possible.	The	regulation	of	the	Code	Civil	developed	a	
highly	 complicated	 casuistic	 system,	 which	 states	 that	 the	 older	 from	 among	 the	
persons	younger	than	fifteen	years	old	who	die	in	the	same	event,	the	younger	from	
among	 the	persons	over	 sixty	who	die	 in	 the	 same	event,	 and	 the	 younger	of	 two	
persons	when	one	of	 them	is	under	 fifteen	and	the	other	one	 is	over	sixty	shall	be	
deemed	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 other.53	 From	 among	 a	 man	 and	 woman	 between	
fifteen	and	sixty	who	die	in	the	same	event	–	when	they	are	of	the	same	age	or	the	
difference	of	age	between	them	is	not	more	than	one	year	–	the	 law	presumes	the	
man	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 woman,	 and	 if	 they	 are	 of	 the	 same	 gender,	 then	 the	
younger	shall	be	considered	survivor	based	on	the	natural	order	of	their	obtaining	
the	 inheritance.54	 This	 latter	 rule	 places	 the	 presumption	 set	 up	 on	 a	 completely	
                                                            
49	Idem,	p.	359.	
50	On	 Code	 Civil	 see	 E	 Gaudemet,	 L’interpretation	 du	 Code	 civil	 en	 France	 depuis	 1804,	 Paris,	 1935;		
A.	Bürge,	Ausstrahlungen	der	historischen	Rechtsschule	in	Frankreich,	in	ZeuP,	5,	1997,	pp.	643–653.	
51	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	193.	
52	Cc.	720.	§	Si	plusieurs	personnes	respectivement	appelées	à	la	succession	l’une	de	l’autre,	périssent	dans	
un	mème	événement,	sans	qu’on	puisse	reconnaître	 laquelle	est	décédée	 la	première,	 la	présomption	de	
survie	est	determinée	par	les	circonstances	du	fait,	et,	à	leur	défaut,	par	la	force	de	l’àge	ou	du	sexe.	
53	Cc.	721.	§	Si	ceux	qui	ont	péri	ensemble,	avaient	moins	du	quinze	ans,	 le	plus	âgé	sera	présumé	avoir	
survécu.	S’ils	étaient	tous	au	dessus	de	soixante	ans,	 le	moins	âgé	sera	présumé	avoir	survécu.	Si	 les	uns	
avaient	moins	de	quinze	ans,	et	les	autres	plus	de	soixante,	les	premiers	seront	présumés	avoir	survécu.	
54	Cc.	722.	§	Si	ceux	qui	ont	péri	ensemble,	avaient	quinze	ans	accomplis	et	moins	de	soixante,	le	màle	est	
toujours	présumé	avoir	survécu,	 lorsqu’il	y	a	égalité	d’âge,	o	si	 la	différence	qui	existe	n’excède	pas	une	
année.	 S’ils	 étaient	 du	même	 sexe,	 la	 présomption	 de	 suivre	 quidonne	 ouverture	 à	 la	 succession	 dans	
l’ordre	de	la	nature,	doit	être	admise:	ainsi	le	plus	jeune	est	présumé	avoir	survécu	au	plus	âgé.	
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different	basis:	 so	 far	physical	capacity	 to	resist	constituted	 the	basis	of	 reference,	
while	here	reference	is	made	to	the	regular	order	of	inheritance;	the	former	cause	of	
reference	 is	 not	 necessarily	 valid	 because	 –	 as	 Hamza	 and	 Sajó	 notes	 –	 ”there	 is	
nothing	 to	 be	 said	 for	 the	 regular	 resistance	 to	 illnesses	 and	 suffering	 being	
authoritative	in	the	situations	regulated	here,	…:	in	the	case	of	an	exploding	aeroplane	
there	 is	 scarcely	 any	 difference	 between	 a	 circus	 strongman	 and	 his	 fragile	wife.”55	
Nevertheless,	the	detailed	regulation	of	Code	Civil	does	not	provide	any	solution	for	
the	case	when	the	two	commoriens	in	common	disaster	are	between	fifteen	and	sixty	
or	over	sixty.	French	legal	practice	did	not	welcome	this	provision	of	the	Code	Civil	
since	 it	 constitutes	 exception	 to	 the	 general	 rule	 on	 absentees56	 and	 to	 the	
”affirmanti	 incumbit	probatio”	 principle57,	 therefore,	 they	 apply	 it	 only	 to	 intestate	
succession	 by	 exercising	 interpretatio	 restrictiva	 and	 require	 identical	 cause	 of	
death.58	
II.	2.	 In	 its	provisions	applicable	 to	persons	who	died	 in	common	disaster	 the	
Preußisches	Allgemeines	Landrecht59	defines	the	term	of	gemeinsames	Unglück	–	later	
introduced	in	Hungarian	terminology	–	and	the	state	of	facts	of	simultaneous	death;	
in	both	cases	 it	orders	to	presume	death	that	occurs	at	 the	same	time	if	 the	actual	
order	 of	 death	 cannot	 be	 determined.60	 The	 Austrian	 Allgemeines	 Bürgerliches	
Gesetzbuch61	does	not	set	up	a	casuistic	presumption	system	regarding	the	order	of	
death;	it	states	instead	that	whenever	it	is	doubtful	who	died	earlier,	the	burden	of	
proof	shall	be	borne	by	the	party	who	refers	to	the	earlier	or	later	death	of	the	given	
deceased;	when	the	demonstration	fails	to	produce	any	result,	one	must	set	out	from	
the	point	 that	death	 occurred	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 the	 case	of	 both	persons.62	The	
term	 of	 common	 disaster	 is	 not	 set	 out	 in	 the	 paragraph	 of	 the	 Allgemeines	
Bürgerliches	Gesetzbuch,	having	been	repealed	since	then;	its	regulation	is	similar	to	
the	solution	of	classical	Roman	law	of	refutable	presumption	of	death	of	non‐family	
members	as	a	result	of	the	same	event,63	it	provides	the	possibility	of	demonstration	
                                                            
55	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	194.	
56	Cc.	135.	§	Quiconque	réclamera	un	droit	échu	à	un	individu	dont	l’existence	ne	sera	pas	reconnue,	devra	
prouver	que	 ledit	 individu	existait	quand	 le	droit	a	été	ouvert:	 jusqu’à	cette	preuve,	 il	 sera	déclaré	non	
recevable	dans	sa	demande.	
57	Cf.	Paul.	D.	22.	3.	2;	Földi–Hamza,	op.	cit.,	p.	159.	
58	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	194.	
59	On	Allgemeines	Landrecht	see	H.	Thieme,	Die	preussische	Kodifikation,	in	ZSS	GA,	57,	1937;	200	Jahre	
Allgemeines	 Landrecht	 für	 die	 preußischen	 Staaten.	Wirkungsgeschichte	 und	 internationaler	 Kontext,	
Frankfurt	a.	M.,	1995.	
60	ALR	 39.	 §	Wenn	 zwei	 oder	mehrere	Menschen	 ihr	 Leben	 in	 einem	 gemeinsamen	Unglücke	 verloren	
haben,	daß	nicht	ausgemittelt	werden	kann,	welcher	zuerst	verstorben	sei;	so	soll	angenommen	werden,	
daß	keiner	den	anderen	überlebt	habe.	
61	On	Allgemeines	Bürgerliches	Gesetzbuch	see	W.	Brauneder,	Das	Allgemeine	Bürgerliche	Gesetzbuch	für	
die	gesamten	Deutschen	Erbländer	der	österreichischen	Monarchie	von	1811,	 in	 ”Gutenberg‐Jahrbuch”,	
1987;	 Idem,	 Das	 österreichische	 ABGB	 als	 neuständische	 Zivilrechtskodifikation,	 in	 ”Vestigia	 Iuris	
Romani.	Festschrift	für	G.	Wesener”,	Graz,	1992.	
62	ABGB	 25.	 §	 Im	 Zweifel,	 welche	 von	 zwei	 oder	 mehreren	 verstorbenen	 Personen	 zuerst	 mit	 Tod	
abgegangen	sei,	muß	derjenige,	welcher	den	 früheren	Todesfall	des	Einen,	oder	des	Anderen	behauptet,	
seine	Behauptung	beweisen;	kann	er	dieses	nicht,	so	werden	Alle	als	zu	gleicher	Zeit	verstorben	vermuthet,	
und	es	kann	von	Übertragung	der	Rechte	des	Einen	auf	den	Anderen	keine	Rede	sein.	
63	Marci.	D.	34.	5.	18.	pr.	
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but	in	case	it	fails,	it	presumes	simultaneous	death.64	The	Bürgerliches	Gesetzbuch	für	
das	 Königreich	 Sachsen	 of	 1863	 –	 although	 within	 the	 personal	 and	 not	 the	
inheritance	part	–	regulates	the	issue	similarly	to	the	ABGB;65	in	other	words,	in	the	
absence	of	counter‐evidence	simultaneous	death	shall	be	assumed.66	In	accordance	
with	 the	 Swiss	 Zivilgesetzbuch67,	 when	 it	 cannot	 be	 proved	 that	 one	 of	 several	
deceased	 persons	 has	 survived	 the	 other,	 then	 death	 occurring	 at	 the	 same	 time	
shall	 be	 assumed;68	 the	 term	 of	 common	 disaster	 has	 not	 been	 adopted	 in	 legal	
literature	because	it	would	lead	to	unnecessary	narrowing	of	the	cases	that	belong	
to	this	scope.69	The	provision	of	the	German	Bürgerliches	Gesetzbuch70	–	now	having	
been	repealed	–	presumes	death	of	persons	who	die	in	common	disaster	occurring	
at	the	same	time;71	it	is	worth	adding	that	the	relevant	paragraph	contains	the	term	
of	 gemeinsame	 Gefahr	 and	 no	 reference	 is	 made	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 counter‐
evidence,	 i.e.,	 to	the	fact	that	this	rule	can	be	applied	only	when	the	order	of	death	
cannot	be	proved.72	
II.	3.	The	Law	of	Property	Act	of	1925	provides	that	in	case	two	or	more	persons	
die	in	circumstances	where	it	is	not	possible	to	decide	who	has	survived	the	other,	
the	younger	one	shall	be	considered	survivor.73	However,	this	solution	–	which	rests	
solely	on	a	logical	basis	but	suits	common	sense	often	referred	to	in	the	Anglo‐Saxon	
legal	 system	 –	 is	 not	 applicable	 when	 the	 question	 of	 the	 order	 of	 death	 arises	
between	marital	partners;	 in	 this	case	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	refer	 to	presumption	of	
survival	 with	 regard	 to	 any	 of	 them;	 that	 is,	 none	 of	 them	 will	 inherit	 from	 the	
other.74	 In	 the	United	 States	 of	America,	 the	Uniform	Simultaneous	Death	Act	with	
almost	 identical	 text	 in	 all	 of	 the	 states	 from	 the	 1950’s	 regulates	 the	 issue	 as	
follows.	 Where	 property	 or	 other	 title	 depends	 on	 priority	 of	 death,	 and	
simultaneous	death	cannot	be	sufficiently	proved,	the	property	of	each	person	shall	
be	 considered	 as	 if	 such	 person	 had	 been	 the	 survivor.	 If	 the	 beneficiary’s	 right	
depends	on	whether	he/she	survives	 the	other,	and	simultaneous	death	cannot	be	
proved	properly,	the	entitled	party	shall	be	considered	a	not‐survivor.	In	the	case	of	
mutual	 beneficiaries	 the	 property	 shall	 be	 divided	 into	 equal	 parts	 in	 a	 number	
corresponding	 to	 the	number	of	 the	beneficiaries	 and	 these	parts	 shall	 be	divided	
                                                            
64	Hamza‐Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	195.	
65	2007.	§	
66	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	195.	
67	See	 also	H.	 Legras‐Herm,	Grundriss	der	 schweizerischen	Rechtsgeschichte.	Zürich,	 1935;	 P.	 Tuor,	Le	
Code	civil	Suisse.	Exposé	systématique,	Zürich,	1942.	
68	ZGB	32.	§	2.	Kann	nicht	bewiesen	werden,	daß	von	mehreren	gestorbenen	Personen	die	eine	die	andere	
überlebt	habe,	so	gelten	sie	als	gleichzeitig	verstorben.	
69	Hamza‐Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	195.	
70	On	Bürgerliches	Gesetzbuch	 see	 J.	W.	Hedemann,	Die	Fortschritte	des	Zivilrechts	 im	XIX.	 Jahrhundert.	
Ein	 Überblick	 über	 die	 Entfaltung	 des	 Privatrechts	 in	 Deutschland,	 Österreich,	 Frankreich	 und	 der	
Schweiz,	Berlin,	1910–1935;	M.	John,	Politics	and	Law	in	Late	Nineteenth‐Century	Germany.	The	Origins	
of	the	Civil	Code,	Oxford,	1989.	
71	BGB	 20.	 §	 Sind	 mehrere	 in	 einer	 gemeinsanem	 Gefahr	 umgekommen,	 so	 wird	 vermutet,	 daß	 sie	
gleichzeitig	gestorben	seien.	
72	Hamza‐Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	196.	
73	Law	of	Property	Act	(1925),	p.	184.	
74	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	196.	
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among	those	who	would	be	beneficiaries	in	case	they	survived.	Regarding	spouses’	
joint	property	and	joint	ownership	the	division	is	fifty	percent,	and	in	life	insurance	
the	 beneficiary	 shall	 be	 considered	 survivor.	 So,	 the	 American	 regulation	 lets	 the	
principle	 of	 ”affirmanti	 incumbit	 probatio”75	 prevail,	 and	 when	 production	 of	
evidence	brings	no	 result	or	 is	 impossible,	 it	presumes	simultaneous	death,	which	
makes	mutual	inheritance	possible.76	
II.	4.	The	General	Private	Law	Bill	of	1871	of	Boldizsár	Horváth,	 in	 its	part	on	
persons,	sets	up	a	refutable	presumption	in	case	of	doubt	of	the	simultaneous	death	
of	 ”several	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 the	 same	 danger	 of	 death”77.	 The	 first	 text	 of	 the	
Hungarian	General	Civil	Code	published	in	1900	also	sets	up	refutable	presumption	
of	simultaneous	death	of	persons	who	die	 in	common	disaster	at	 the	same	time	in	
case	the	time	of	death	cannot	be	proved;78	this	regulation	proposal	is	taken	over	by	
the	1913	version	as	well.79	The	Private	Law	Bill	of	1928	does	not	set	up	presumption	
concerning	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 common	 disaster,	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 declaring	
somebody	 legally	dead80	mentions81	 that	 the	Private	Law	Bill	places	 the	burden	of	
proof	on	the	party	who	alleges	the	order	of	death,	as	it	states	expressis	verbis	that	it	
does	not	intend	to	construct	any	presumption	for	this	case.82	
	
III.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 regulations	 looked	 at	 so	 far	 and	 the	 possible	 logical	
combinations	 the	 question	 could	 be	 settled	 –	 according	 to	 the	 opinion	 of	 Gábor	
Hamza	and	András	Sajó	–	as	follows.83	
When	the	parties	have	the	possibility	of	production	of	evidence	concerning	the	
time	of	death,	then	we	distinguish	three	main	regulatory	directions:	
a) In	total	absence	of	 legal	presumption	the	parties	have	unlimited	possibility	
of	production	of	evidence,	as	 it	 is	set	out	 in	 the	currently	effective	Hungarian	Civil	
Code	(Ptk.)	as	well.	For	 lack	of	evidence	the	 judge	 is	compelled	to	take	a	stand	for	
simultaneous	death.	The	disadvantage	of	the	solution	is	that	total	freedom	of	proof	
and	 accidental	 factors	 of	 survival	 might	 make	 the	 parties	 apt	 to	 manipulate	 the	
facts.84	
b) In	case	of	unsuccessful	production	of	evidence	under	total	freedom	of	proof,	
legal	 presumption	 shall	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 order	 of	 death,	 as	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	
system	of	the	Code	civil.	(More	specifically,	we	distinguish	the	two	sub‐cases	where,	
on	the	one	hand,	even	quite	weak	proofs	can	eliminate	the	presumption,	and,	on	the	
other	hand,	only	convincing	determination	of	 the	order	of	death	makes	 it	possible	
not	to	apply	the	presumption.)	
                                                            
75	Paul.	D.	22.	3.	2.	
76	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	197.	
77	Általános	 Magánjogi	 Törvénykönyv	 Tervezete	 Magyarország	 számára	 I.	 in	 ”Közlemény	 Általános	
Rész”,	Pest,	1871.	§	31.		
78	Indokolás	a	Magyar	Általános	Polgári	Törvénykönyv	Tervezetéhez	I.,	Budapest,	1901,	§	15.		
79	§	18.		
80	Mjt.	39–42.	§.	
81	Indokolás	Magyarország	Magánjogi	Törvénykönyvének	Törvényjavaslatához	I.,	Budapest,	1929,	p.	32.		
82	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	198.	
83	Idem,	pp.	198–199.	
84	Idem,	p.	198.	
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c) As	a	general	rule	the	presumption	is	applied	and	production	of	evidence	lies	
only	 as	 exception.	 This	 solution	 can	 be	 separated	 only	 logically	 from	 the	 above	
outlined	possibility	which	states	 that	only	substantiated	proofs	 taken	 into	account	
primarily	make	it	possible	to	eliminate	the	presumption	as	secondary	alternative.85	
If	we	exclude	 the	parties’	 right	of	proof,	 then	 there	are	 two	solutions	and	 the	
second	version	again	raises	two	possibilities.	
a) We	determine	an	obligatory	order	of	death.	
b) We	presume	simultaneity	of	death.	In	this	latter	case,	it	occurs	as	one	of	the	
possibilities	 that	 the	 parties	mutually	 inherit	 from	 each	 other	 as	 they	 died	 at	 the	
same	time;	 the	other	possible	path	 to	 take	seems	 to	be	 that	as	persons	eliminated	
from	 succession	 they	 do	 not	 inherit	 from	 each	 other	 since	 none	 of	 them	 can	 be	
considered	 being	 alive	 after	 the	 other	 person’s	 death.	 The	 first	 possibility	 can	 be	
correct	only	in	a	certain	aspect,	for	example,	in	the	system	of	demonstration	based	
on	the	Code	civil,	however,	as	the	aim	is	just	to	avoid	undesirable	proving,	it	should	
be	logically	rejected.86	
	
IV.	After	 the	 logically	deducible	 regulation	models	 let	us	 look	at	 this	problem	
area	through	a	few	examples,	which	we	solve	on	the	basis	of	the	effective	Hungarian	
Civil	Code	(Ptk.),	the	draft	amendment	and	the	proposal.	In	accordance	with	Section	
600	 a)	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 a	 person	who	 dies	 before	 the	 testator	will	 be	 eliminated	
from	 succession.	 Consequently,	 one	 can	 share	 the	 estate	 if	 the	 given	 person	 has	
survived	the	testator.	So,	succession	–	as	acquisition	in	case	of	death	–	is	considered	
acquisition	subject	to	the	condition	of	survival.87	This	concise	regulation	also	reveals	
that	our	law	of	inheritance	does	not	define	the	presumption	of	simultaneous	death	
in	common	disaster.	This	results	in	that	in	case	of	family	members	who	die	in	traffic	
accident	 it	 is	necessary	to	clarify	the	 time	of	death	of	each	family	member	and	the	
order	 of	 death	 to	 be	 able	 to	 determine	 the	 order	 of	 succession.88	 Lack	 of	 the	
presumption	of	simultaneous	death	in	common	disaster	causes	serious	difficulties	in	
production	 of	 evidence	 when	 determining	 the	 order	 of	 death	 and	 the	 order	 of	
succession	of	 the	persons	who	die.89	We	agree	with	Lajos	Vékás	 that	 in	 this	case	–	
except	for	inheritance	under	a	will	–	chance	influences	the	order	of	succession.90	
The	 concept	 of	 the	 new	 Civil	 Code	 (Ptk.)	 would	 amend	 the	 effective	 text	
(Section	 600	 a))	 as	 follows	 ”a	 person	 who	 does	 not	 survive	 the	 testator	 will	 be	
eliminated	 from	 succession”.91	 The	 concept	 adduces	 the	 following	 reason	 for	
changing	 the	wording	 ”with	 such	 formulation	 inheritance	disputes	on	 succession	 to	
                                                            
85	Idem,	p.	198.	
86	Idem,	p.	199.	
87	M.	Világhy,	Gy.	Eörsi,	Magyar	polgári	jog.	(Hungarian	civil	law),	Budapest,	1965,	II,	p.	410.	
88	Gy.	 Gellért	 (ed.),	 A	 polgári	 Törvénykönyv	 magyarázata.	 (Commentary	 on	 Hungarian	 Civil	 Code),	
Budapest,	2001,	2002‐2003.		
89	L.	Vékás,	Magyar	polgári	jog.	Öröklési	jog.	(Hungarian	civil	law.	Law	of	inheritance),	Budapest,	1995,	
p.	20.	
90	L.	Vékás,	op.	cit.,	pp.	20–21.	
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simultaneously	 died	 persons	 can	 be	 prevented”.92	 We	 are	 on	 the	 opinion	 that	 this	
reason	 is	 not	 fully	 valid	 because	 a	 person	who	 does	 not	 survive	 the	 testator	 dies	
before	or	at	the	same	time	as	him	or	her.	So,	the	draft	formulation	has	a	wider	sense	
than	the	currently	effective	text	variant	to	the	extent	that	a	person	dying	at	the	same	
time	as	the	testator	will	be	also	eliminated	from	succession.	However,	this	variation	
will	not	solve	 the	difficulty	of	determining	and	proving	 the	 times	of	death	and	 the	
order	of	death	and	does	not	eliminate	chance	either.	
Yet,	we	agree	with	the	assumption	of	the	concept	that	”in	this	respect	it	is	worth	
pondering	over	the	determination	of	a	cause	of	elimination	that	in	such	cases	excludes	
inheritance	 from	 each	 other	 of	 persons	who	 die	 in	 ’common	 disaster’,	 today	much	
rather	 in	 a	 common	 accident	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 other	 similar	 event,	 actually	 not	
completely	at	 the	 same	 time—the	 inheritance	of	 the	person	who	dies	 later	 from	 the	
person	 who	 dies	 earlier”.93	 The	 concept	 provides	 the	 following	 reasons—in	 our	
opinion	 logically	 invalidly	as	we	shall	detail	 it	 later:	”Today	this	question	can	be	no	
longer	solved	by	presumptions;	yet,	without	such	a	rule	strikingly	unjust	results	can	be	
produced.	This	especially	applies	to	inheritance	from	marital	partners	who	die	without	
descendants	where	survival	of	one	of	them	by	any	short	period	–	usually	without	the	
spouse	who	dies	 later	recovering	consciousness	–	would	devolve	the	estate	of	both	of	
them	 to	 the	 family	of	 the	 spouse	who	dies	 later.	Unfortunately,	 today	 such	accidents	
are	 not	 exceptional	 at	 all.”94	 This	 solution	 would	 provide	 succession	 only	 for	 the	
person	 who	 survives	 the	 common	 event	 indeed,	 irrespective	 if	 he/she	 was	 a	
participant	of	the	common	event.	
When	 we	 look	 at	 various	 succession	 situations,	 then	 it	 can	 be	 cleared	 up	
whether	it	is	the	text	(a)	of	the	law	in	force,	(b)	of	the	planned	amendment	or	(c)	of	
the	proposal	that	leads	to	a	juster	result.	
First,	let	us	look	at	the	situation	brought	up	as	an	example:	
	
Spouse	1	 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐	 Spouse	2	(without	descendants)	
	
In	 a	 traffic	 accident	 Spouse	 1	 dies	 first,	 Spouse	 2	 survives	 him/her	 by	 a	 few	
minutes	without	recovering	consciousness.	
In	the	absence	of	descendants95	Spouse	2	will	inherit,	thereafter	he/she	will	be	
the	testator	and	as	he/she	also	dies,	the	common	property	of	Spouse	1	and	Spouse	2	
will	devolve	to	the	parents	of	Spouse	2.96	
As	Spouse	2	survived	Spouse	1,	in	accordance	with	Section	607	(4)	of	the	Civil	
Code	 (Ptk.),	he/she	will	 inherit,	 and	 through	his/her	death	a	 few	minutes	 later,	 in	
accordance	 with	 Section	 608	 (1)	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 his/her	 parents	 will	 be	 the	
inheritors.	 Consequently,	 the	 planned	 amendment	 to	 the	 text	 does	 not	 provide	
better	solution	for	this	case.	
                                                            
92	Ibid.	
93	Ibid.	
94	Ibid.	
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If	 we	 exclude	 inheritance	 from	 each	 other	 of	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 common	
disaster,	 then	 the	parents	of	 the	 two	 testators	 (Spouse	1,	 Spouse	2)	will	 inherit	 in	
equal	 parts;	 that	 is,	 the	 proposal	 to	 supplement	 the	 text	 would	 result	 in	 a	 juster	
solution.	
If	Spouse	1	and	Spouse	2	(also	without	descendants)	died	provably	at	the	same	
time	in	a	traffic	accident,	thenin	accordance	with	the	effective	text	none	of	them	died	
before	the	other,	that	is,	they	mutually	inherit	from	each	other	(!)	and	their	parents	
inherit	from	them;	
 based	on	the	draft	text	of	the	concept	now	the	parents	of	Spouse	1	and	
Spouse	2	will	inherit	in	equal	parts;	
 the	proposed	arrangement	would	lead	to	this	result	as	well.	
	
												If					 	 Mother	‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐	Father	
	
	
	
	
Child	
have	 died	 in	 an	 air	 crash,	 and	 the	 order	 of	 death	 has	 been	 determined		
(1:	mother,	2:	father,	3:	child)	
a)	 the	 child	 inherits	 from	 his/her	 parents	 but	 as	 he/she	 does	 not	 have	 any	
descendants,	 spouse,	 parents	 (because	 they	died	before	him/her)	 and	 the	parents	
do	 not	 have	 any	 descendants,	 the	 grandparents	 (in	 the	 absence	 of	 them	 the	
grandparents’	descendants)	of	 the	testator	(the	child)	will	be	 the	 intestate	heirs	 in	
equal	parts;97	
b)	the	planned	change	to	the	text	would	also	lead	to	the	result	set	out	in	point	
a).	 (Here,	only	simultaneous	death	 leads	 to	more	appropriate	 result	 than	point	a):	
the	deceased	persons	do	not	inherit	”from	one	end	to	the	other”	from	each	other,	the	
next	parentela	–	here	the	grandparents	–	will	inherit);	
c) exclusion	 of	 inheritance	 from	each	 other	 of	 persons	who	die	 in	 a	 common	
accident	 would	 also	 lead	 to	 the	 inheritance	 of	 the	 grandparents’	 parentela.	
Consequently,	 in	 this	 situation	 there	 is	 no	 difference	 between	 the	 possibilities	
provided	by	the	three	rules.	
If	we	reverse	the	order	of	death	of	this	succession	situation:	1)	child,	2)	father,	3)	
mother,	then	the	following	can	be	outlined:	
 the	 deceased	 child	 does	 not	 have	descendants,	 spouse;	 so,	 his/her	 parents	
will	 inherit	 from	him/her	 in	equal	parts.	The	mother	(as	spouse)	will	 inherit	 from	
the	 father,	 due	 to	 elimination	 of	 the	 descendant,	 and	 through	 her	 death	 –	 in	 the	
absence	of	descendant	and	her	spouse	–	the	mother’s	parents	will	be	the	inheritors;	
in	other	words,	the	total	estate	will	belong	to	the	mother’s	family;	
 as	 both	 the	 mother	 and	 the	 father	 survived	 the	 child,	 they	 were	 not	
eliminated	from	succession;	so,	the	solution	set	out	in	the	draft	text	is	equal	to	the	
solution	set	out	in	point	a),	i.e.,	it	is	not	any	juster;	
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 according	to	the	proposal	the	father	and	the	mother	cannot	inherit	from	the	
child	(and	they	cannot	 inherit	 from	each	other);	so,	 in	the	absence	of	descendants,	
spouse,	and	parents	(and	their	descendants)	the	child’s	grandparents	(the	parents	of	
the	father	and	mother)	will	inherit	in	equal	parts.	
If		 Mother		‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐Father	
	
	
	
Child	 Child	(from	previous	marriage)	
	
die	 in	an	air	 crash	and	 the	order	of	death	 is:	 1)	mother	2)	 father	3)	 common	
child	(the	separate	child	is	survivor	or	is	not	participant	of	the	accident):	
a. the	common	child	will	inherit	from	the	mother,	the	two	children	will	inherit	
from	 the	 father	 (half‐and‐half),	 after	 the	death	of	 the	 common	child,	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 descendants,	 spouse	 and	 parents,	 his/her	 half‐sibling,	 the	
separate	child	will	inherit;98	
b. the	alteration	of	the	concept	leads	to	the	same	not	quite	fair	solution.	In	case	
of	simultaneous	death	a	juster	result	would	be	produced:	the	separate	child	
and	the	grandparents	on	the	mother’s	side	would	inherit	half‐and‐half;	
c. in	the	case	of	exclusion	of	inheritance	from	each	other	of	persons	who	die	in	
a	 common	event	 –	 irrespective	of	 the	order	of	death	–	 the	 common	child’s	
grandparents	 on	 the	 mother’s	 side	 and	 the	 father’s	 separate	 child	 would	
inherit	half‐and‐half.	
If	 the	order	of	death	changes:	1)	 father,	2)	common	child	3)	mother,	 then	 the	
following	solutions	can	be	outlined:	
a) the	two	children	will	 inherit	from	the	father	in	equal	parts,	 the	mother	will	
inherit	 from	 the	 common	 child,	 and	 the	 mother’s	 parents	 will	 inherit	 from	 the	
mother	in	equal	parts;	so,	the	property	will	be	divided	between	the	two	families;	
b) the	draft	text	–	 including	the	case	of	simultaneous	death	–	also	leads	to	the	
result	set	out	in	point	a);	
c) the	proposal	also	provides	the	solution	outlined	in	point	a):	the	father’s	child	
from	the	previous	marriage	and	the	mother’s	parents	will	inherit	the	property.	
	
In	 case	 times	of	death	differ	 again:	 1)	 father	2)	mother	3)	 common	child,	 the	
following	remarks	can	be	made:	
a) in	case	the	father	dies,	the	two	children	will	inherit	in	equal	parts,	when	the	
mother	dies,	the	common	child	will	inherit,	and	if	the	common	child	dies	–	as	in	the	
place	of	the	parent	eliminated	from	succession	his/her	descendant	will	inherit	–	the	
separate	child	will	inherit;	
b) the	 draft	 text	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 result	 described	 in	 point	 a),	 only	
simultaneous	death	would	be	juster	than	that	because	through	the	succession	of	the	
separate	 child	 and	 the	mother’s	 parents	 the	 estate	would	 be	 divided	 between	 the	
two	families;	
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c) the	proposal	would	be	 juster:	 from	the	first,	 it	would	 lead	to	 inheritance	 in	
equal	parts	between	the	separate	child	and	the	mother’s	parents.	
	
If	death	occurred	as	follows:	1)	mother	2)	common	child	3)	father,	then:	
a) the	common	child	will	 inherit	 from	the	mother,	 the	 father	will	 inherit	 from	
the	common	child,	and	the	separate	child	will	inherit	from	the	father;	
b) the	text	variant	of	the	concept	would	also	result	in	this	chain	of	inheritance,	
except	for	the	case	of	simultaneous	death	(see	point	c));	
c) the	proposal	would	be	fairer	for	the	two	families,	the	separate	child	and	the	
mother’s	parents	would	inherit.	
	
If	the	common	child	dies	first	and	he/she	is	followed	by	the	parents	(father	and	
mother	–	in	this	order),	then:	
 the	 father	 and	 mother	 will	 inherit	 from	 the	 common	 child	 in	 an	 equal	
proportion,	the	separate	child	will	inherit	from	the	father,	and	the	mother’s	property	
will	devolve	to	her	parents;	
 the	same	result	is	produced	in	the	planned	amendment,	including	the	case	of	
simultaneous	death;	
 based	on	the	proposal	the	separate	child	and	the	mother’s	parents	will	share	
the	estate	in	equal	parts.	
	
If	 the	 common	 child	 is	 followed	 by	 the	 mother	 and	 then	 by	 the	 father,	 the	
solution	 is	 identical	with	 the	 above:	 the	 common	 child’s	 parents	will	 inherit	 from	
him/her	 in	 equal	 parts;	 while	 the	 separate	 child	 will	 inherit	 from	 the	 father,	 the	
mother’s	parents	will	inherit	from	the	mother,	based	on	almost	all	the	three	texts	of	
the	 rule	 (effective,	 draft	 amendment,	 proposal).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 situation	
outlined	 in	 the	above	 two	paragraphs	applies	 to	 the	property	of	 the	died	common	
child,	 the	 parent’s	 common	 property	 will	 devolve	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 above	
quoted	provisions	of	inheritance	law.	
	
In	the	long	process	of	the	re‐codification	of	the	Hungarian	Civil	Law	(Ptk.)	the	
lawmaker	 adhered	 to	 the	 provisions	 set	 out	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 2002.	 In	 6:4	
(Elimination	 from	succession)	 the	Expert’s	Proposal	of	200899	provides	as	 follows:	
”A	 person	 who	 does	 not	 survive	 the	 testator	 will	 be	 eliminated	 from	 succession.	
With	respect	to	inheritance	from	each	other,	persons	who	die	in	a	common	accident	
or	other	similar	emergency	situation	shall	be	considered	eliminated	from	succession	
irrespective	 of	 the	 order	 of	 the	 occurrence	death”.	 In	 the	 reasons	 attached	 to	 this	
requirement100	 the	 Expert’s	 Proposal	 expresses	 the	 codifier	 ’s	 intention	 not	 to	
regulate	this	scope	of	issues	by	presumption	because	”at	best,	by	legal	presumption	
the	order	of	inheritance	of	persons	who	die	in	common	disaster	can	be	determined,	
but	 the	 so	 produced	 unjust	 result	 cannot	 be	 avoided”.	 The	 aim	 set	 is	 that	 ”the	
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Proposal	should	formulate	the	rule	that	the	persons	who	die	in	a	common	accident	
or	other	similar	emergency	situation	shall	be	considered	eliminated	from	succession	
with	 respect	 to	 intestate	 succession	 and	 testamentary	 succession	 to	 each	 other	
irrespective	of	the	order	of	the	occurrence	of	death.	By	this	solution	it	is	possible	to	
avoid	the	unjust	solution	that	depending	on	the	order	of	the	deaths	and	thereby	the	
opening	of	inheritance	that	follow	each	other	by	chance	(and	are	quite	often	hard	to	
determine),	 the	 property	 of	 the	 testator	 (usually	 spouse	 or	 common	 law	 partner)	
should	 devolve	 within	 a	 short	 time	 to	 the	 family	 of	 the	 intestate	 (possibly	
testamentary)	 heir	 who	 just	 survives	 him/her”.	 As	 we	 have	 analysed	 it	 above	
through	 several	 specific	 examples,	 this	 solution	 leads	 to	 a	 fairer	 solution	 than	 the	
effective	Civil	Law;	however,	 iniquities	arising	 from	death	 in	common	disaster	are	
not	eliminated.	Furthermore,	the	formulation	of	the	second	French	paragraph	of	the	
provision	might	seem	to	set	up	an	irrefutable	presumption:	”…	shall	be	considered	
eliminated”;	therefore,	it	is	possible	that	the	lawmaker’s	intention	was	expressly	to	
avoid	creation	of	 legal	presumption,101	however,	 in	 this	respect	 the	wording	of	 the	
legal	rule	has	not	become	unambiguously	clear.	
The	wording	of	Act	CXX	of	2009	(the	”new	Civil	Code”)	not	entered	into	force	is	
even	less	fortunate,	following	the	ideas	of	the	Expert’s	Proposal	the	wording	meant	
to	be	identical/synonymous	even	adds	to	the	problems	that	arise	in	the	former:	
‐	it	states	elimination	only	with	respect	to	persons	who	”die	at	the	same	time”	
in	 a	 common	 accident	 or	 other	 similar	 emergency	 situation,	 and	 does	 not	 state	 it	
with	 respect	 to	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 the	 same	 common	 event	 within	 a	 short	 time	
following	each	other;	
‐	 if	 it	 is	 only	 persons	 who	 die	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 are	 eliminated	 from	
succession,	 then	why	is	 it	necessary	to	write	the	term	”irrespective	of	 the	order	of	
the	occurrence	of	death”	into	the	norm	text	since	there	is	no	order	of	death	in	death	
at	 the	same	 time;	 so,	 there	 is	 tension	even	within	 the	second	French	paragraph	of	
the	 given	 section,	 and	 the	 careless,	 self‐contradictory	 wording	 pushes	 the	 reader	
even	more	towards	irrefutable	presumption‐like	interpretation.	
The	proposal	of	the	”New	Civil	Code”	Codification	Committee102	repeats	the	text	
of	the	Expert’s	Proposal	with	one	difference:	the	term	”died”	is	replaced	by	the	term	
”deceased”;103	thus	preserving	its	above‐described	anomalies.	
	
V.	Based	on	all	the	above,	we	sum	up	our	opinion	as	set	out	below:	
We	 can	 agree	 with	 the	 statements	 formulated	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 new	
Hungarian	 Civil	 Code	 (Ptk.)	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 we	 exclude	 inheritance	 from	 each	
other	of	persons	who	died	in	a	common	event.	This	is	done	in	some	form	or	other	by	
Roman	law	–	apart	from	the	presumption,	applicable	in	a	very	narrow	scope,	which	
regulates	the	order	of	death	by	refutable	presumption	and	allows	inheritance	from	
each	other	in	the	parent/child	relation	–	as	well	as	by	most	of	the	codifications	of	the	
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modern	age,	either	by	preferring	priority	of	the	presumption	or	reserving	it	in	case	
of	unsuccessful	production	of	evidence.	
The	drafter	of	the	concept	appropriately	admits	that	it	is	more	fortunate	to	use	
the	term	”common	event”	 instead	of	”common	disaster”	 in	view	of	the	fact	that	–	as	
we	have	detailed	it	in	the	passages	on	legal	history	–	the	term	of	“common	disaster”	
has	not	become	a	consistently	and	uniformly	applied	terminus	technicus,	its	use	has	
become	 generally	 accepted	mostly	 in	 German	 legal	 terminology	 and	was	 adopted	
from	there	into	Hungarian	legal	language.	It	is	not	less	significant	than	the	tradition	
of	terminology	that	by	”common	disaster”	we	usually	mean	a	link	standing	in	the	rear	
of	the	chain	of	causes	that	leads	to	death,	which	is	not	identical	with	the	particular	
cause	 that	 gives	 rise	 to	 death;	 whereas,	 ”common	 event”	 means	 the	 event	 that	
directly	evokes	death.104	Nevertheless,	the	term	common	event	needs	to	be	further	
narrowed:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 relation	 in	 time	 –	
simultaneity	–	relation	in	space	–	for	example,	identical	theatre	of	operations	in	war	
–	 should	 exist	 as	 well;	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 an	 indispensable	 conceptual	
element	that	the	act	of	none	of	the	persons	should	be	the	cause	of	the	other	person’s	
death	–	one	should	think	of	a	person	who	kills	his	family	and	then	kills	himself	or	a	
person	 who	 gives	 help	 to	 somebody	 who	 gets	 into	 emergency.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 not	
necessary	that	the	cause	of	death	should	be	identical	in	case	of	both	persons	–	in	a	
shipwreck,	one	of	them	is	killed	by	fire	breaking	out	on	the	ship	and	the	other	one	
gets	 drowned	 –	 however,	 the	 different	 causes	 of	 death	must	 arise	 from	 the	 event	
that	directly	threatens	the	life	of	both	of	them.	Therefore,	we	consider	the	source	of	
danger	a	common	event	that	stands	at	the	beginning	of	a	chain	of	causes	which	can	
directly	give	rise	to	the	death	of	several	persons	and	accordingly	defines	the	scope	of	
possible	victims	exactly.105	
Yet,	we	cannot	agree	with	the	element	of	the	reasons	for	the	concept	of	the	Civil	
Code	which	states	that	it	does	not	consider	the	question	an	issue	that	can	be	solved	
by	presumptions.	The	maker	of	the	concept	considers	common	event	causing	death	
of	several	persons	an	independent	hypothesis	and	states	as	a	disposition	that	none	
of	 these	 persons	will	 inherit	 from	 the	 other.	 Stating	 this	 independent	 disposition,	
however,	suggests	as	if	this	were	not	a	general	principle	of	inheritance	law	–	more	
specifically,	only	the	survivor	can	inherit	and	that	persons	who	do	not	survive	will	
be	eliminated	–	since	a	separate	disposition	attached	to	a	separate	hypothesis	can	be	
considered	 necessary	 only	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 lawmaker	 would	 expect	 different	
conduct	 indeed.	 It	 is	 needless	 to	 repeat	 the	 above‐mentioned	 basic	 principle	 of	
inheritance	law	with	regard	to	a	special	situation	since	we	might	deduce	it	from	this	
partial	emphasis	a	contrario	 that	 the	basic	principle	actually	does	not	exist,	and	 in	
every	 situation	 different	 from	 the	 hypothesis	 the	 contrary	 of	 just	 the	 disposition	
emphasised	here	should	prevail.106	
If	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 give	 room	 to	 complicated	 proving	 that	 promises	 little	
result	and,	above	all,	 leads	quite	often	 to	unfair	 result,	 then	 inheritance	 from	each	
                                                            
104	 	Hamza–Sajó,	op.	cit.,	p.	201.	
105	 	Idem,	p.	201.	
106	 	Idem,	p.	200.	
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other	 of	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 a	 common	 event	 –	 and	 this	 event	 must	 be	 exactly	
circumscribed	 by	 using	 the	 above	 definition	 –	 should	 be	 excluded	 and	 should	 be	
inserted	in	the	Civil	Code	as	cause	of	elimination.	In	our	opinion,	owing	to	the	above‐
deduced	causes	of	legal	logic,	this	can	be	done	by	creating	irrefutable	presumption.	
	
